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A novel method is applied to evaluate the effect of capital constraints on entrepreneurial
performance on a panel of 1,000 Dutch entrepreneurs. We find that initial capital constraints
hinder entrepreneurs in their performance, even when we control for various human capital
and other factors that might affect both performance and credit scoring outcomes. We use a
direct individual indicator variable for initial capital constraints. Previous research with the
same objective used indirect indicators of wealth, inheritances or windfall gains, where it
remains unknown whether the entrepreneur indeed suffered from capital constraints. This
drawback is not attached to our (neither perfect) approach so that policy implications will
become more evident. 
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Policy”. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The observation of resource spending by governmental institutions for the sake of 
increasing numbers of higher qualified entrepreneurs is explained by the social benefit 
pertaining to entrepreneurial endeavor that far exceed the entrepreneur’s private 
benefit. The population of entrepreneurs is held accountable for searching profit 
opportunities through the introduction of new products, the implementation of lower 
cost production processes, or through the tapping of new markets. By doing so, they 
play an undeniable important role in creating employment and economic growth. 
Another explanatory factor of this observation is the perceived existence of 
undesirable impediments to the supply of entrepreneurs. These factors therefore also 
explain the (academic) research activity focusing on the number and performance of 
entrepreneurs and the factors hindering these. A lack of capital or wealth is one of 
these factors. It is the focus of this study. 
The objective of this paper is to answer the question: To what extent is the 
performance of a small business founder’s entrepreneurial venture, once started, 
affected by the experience of initial capital constraints? And, what part of the effect 
on performance can be attributed to a real capital constraint, lack of opportunity to 
make appropriate investments at the right moments, and what part of the effect might 
be explained by spurious factors that both affect access to capital and performance 
directly, such as screening based on perceived abilities? The distinction between these 
two types of factors is crucial since policy implications diverge. In the first case 
supplying more capital, one way or the other, to entrepreneurs who are hindered to 
follow the optimal investment scheme would improve performance. In the second 
case, it will not because the capital constraint itself is not the binding restriction, but 
the factors underlying it that affect performance. 
Much (empirical) research effort has been put into measuring the effect of capital 
constraints on the selection of individuals into entrepreneurial positions (Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; De Wit 1993; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994b; 
Van Praag and Van Ophem, 1995; Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000). The general conclusion from this type 
of research is that capital constraints bind: a significant proportion of individuals 
willing to enter the entrepreneurial population is hampered by a lack of sufficient 
  2capital. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) present survey evidence that many 
employees would prefer to be self-employed, thereby indicating the existence of 
impediments at large. They also show that self-employed appear to be much more 
(work-) satisfied than are their wage-working counterparts, though the latter earn 
significantly higher and more secured incomes (Hamilton, 2000). Blanchflower and 
Oswald provide evidence that the significant impediments to entrepreneurship as 
indicated by these results are in 50% of cases due to lack of capital. Capital markets 
are no doubt not efficient nor market clearing for the segment of new firms. (Fazzari, 
1988). Personal savings and loans from friends and relatives is by far the largest 
source of capital in newly started firms (as appears from our data and from Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989, Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998).  
The common theoretical explanation for credit rationing vis a vis newly founded 
firms is a severe lack of observable and verifiable information about the 
entrepreneur’s type, her plans and the riskiness associated with these plans. Moreover, 
the entrepreneur, financing her venture by means of borrowed capital, might have 
intentions conflicting with these of the supplier of the loan. The asymmetry of 
information on the entrepreneur’s type and behavior will potentially lead to agency 
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. (LeRoy and Singell, 1987; Boadway et 
al., 1998; De Meza and Webb, 2000). The foresight of these problems prevents the 
start of a significant proportion of ventures. A negative correlation results between 
access to capital and entrepreneurship entry.  
Research effort has also been devoted, though to a lesser extent, to measuring the 
correlation between access to capital and entrepreneurship performance once the stage 
of startup has been successfully completed (Fazzari et al, 1988; Evans and Jovanovic, 
1989; Bates 1990, Cooper et al. 1994; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a; Cressy, 1996; Lindh 
and Ohlsson, 1996; Van Praag, 2002). This paper aims to contribute to this category 
of research. What happens to some common measures of performance when an 
entrepreneur has insufficient capital to reach the optimal investment level or the 
optimal timing of investments? Financial capital constraints might prevent 
entrepreneurs from creating buffers against random shocks, thereby affecting the 
timing of investments in an unfavorable way. Moreover, capital constraints might 
debar entrepreneurs from the pursuit of more capital-intensive strategies. Especially 
the more able entrepreneurs might be hindered in this way, as capital and ability are 
complementary resources for entrepreneurs. (Cf. Boadway 1998, De Meza and Webb, 
  32000, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Research in this area has been performed by 
means of various empirical methods, all with their specific data requirements, 
advantages and, unfortunately, drawbacks.  
Section 2 summarizes and categorizes the research base measuring the extent to 
which entrepreneurs’ performance is hindered by capital constraints. Section 3 then 
elaborates on our method, its contribution and its weaknesses. We employ a self-
reported measure of having experienced binding capital constraints in the first year 
after the start of the venture and we relate this to various performance measures of the 
venture: survival, profit, and labor demand. The empirical analysis is based on a 
representative panel survey amongst almost 1,000 new business founders in the 
Netherlands in the years 1994-1997. We use these new business founders as the 
empirical equivalent of entrepreneurs. In order to measure the effect of capital 
constraints on the firm’s performance due to the impossibility of an optimal 
investment scheme correctly, the effect of our self-reported measure on performance 
should be corrected for various factors turning up in the literature. First of all the 
screening of capital suppliers based on human and social capital factors should be 
taken into account. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity on which redlining might be 
based is to be considered. Finally, time constraints and the motivation to perform by 
the entrepreneur are considered too. Our unconventionally rich database enables these 
corrections. After having discussed how we approach these issues in section 3, we 
discuss the dataset in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the estimation results and 
section 6 concludes: Capital constraints affect performance significantly. 
 
2.   LITERATURE: POSITIONING AND OVERVIEW 
 
A lively theoretical debate has existed about the relationship between access to 
capital and investment decisions of entrepreneurs, ever since entrepreneurship has 
become a topic of study. The first stream of thought assumes capital markets to be 
perfect. External funds provide a perfect substitute for internal capital in this full 
information case. An entrepreneur’s financial conditions are irrelevant to investment: 
investment decisions are independent of whether one needs to “pay” the opportunity 
cost of capital ownership, or the interest rate of borrowing money. Proponents of this 
view can be traced back to Richard Cantillon (1755) who was the earliest scholar of 
whom we know that he paid considerable attention to the entrepreneur. He implicitly 
  4assumed perfect(ly accessible) capital markets. Later classic influential economists 
agreeing with this view were Schumpeter (1934;1911) and Kirzner (1973). 
The second stream of research in entrepreneurship assumes less than perfect capital 
markets due to the existence of imperfect and asymmetric information. The latter 
makes it very costly and sometimes even impossible for providers of external finance 
to evaluate the quality of an entrepreneur’s investment opportunities. This might 
debar (some) entrepreneurs from sufficient access to external capital. As a 
consequence, internal and external capital sources are not perfectly substitutable. This 
view has a history in economic thought of entrepreneurship, too. The performance of 
the entrepreneur in the Classical and Neoclassical theories of Say (1971;1803) and 
Marshall (1930;1890) respectively is hindered by a lack of own capital since 
borrowed capital requires a reputation (Say) or a risk premium (Marshall). Knight 
(1971; 1921) held the same view: investment decisions may depend on capital 
ownership. Interestingly, before this debate regained interest in the entrepreneurship 
research society in the late 1980’s, the same debate took place among researchers 
active in the area of finance and the study of investment at large (all company sizes 
included) in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. As Fazzari et al. (1988) adequately 
summarize, especially the work of Meyer and Kuh (1957) emphasized the importance 
of financial considerations in business investment. This work initiated other 
contributions to such internal funds theories of investment in the late 50’s and early 
60’s. However, most research since the middle 1960’s has isolated real firm 
(investment) decisions from purely financing factors. Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
provided the theoretical basis for this second school of thought. Their key insight was 
that a firm’s financial structure (read: entrepreneur’s own wealth) would not affect its 
market value (read: the entrepreneur’s firm performance) under certain conditions. 
Applied to a firm’s investment decisions, this finding by Modigliani and Miller 
provided a foundation for the neoclassical theory of investment in which firms are 
assumed to face a cost of capital, set in securities markets that does not depend on the 
firm’s particular financial structure. Fazzari (1988) establishes convincing empirical 
evidence for the existence of a capital constraint, especially in the small firm case: 
access to external (borrowed) capital is difficult or at least more costly than is 
investment by means of internal capital.
1 
                                                           
1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) had already put the Modigliani Miller result into the perspective of 
asymmetric information.  
  5The continuation of the debate in the entrepreneurship research area, starting in the 
late 1980s, was largely empirical. Please note that most empirical research, including 
our own, is based on the view, as expressed by De Meza and Webb (2000) that 
asymmetric information applies at least to the type of entrepreneur (hidden type 
problem potentially leading to adverse selection) but may extend to the behavior of 
the entrepreneur (hidden action problem potentially leading to moral hazard). 
Furthermore, to prevent adverse selection in the credit market, the point of departure 
is not credit rationing in response to the hidden type problem but “redlining” or 
screening instead. Redlining, screening, or credit scoring, as applied in almost all real 
life cases,  (De Meza and Webb 2000) involves suppliers of money to use some 
selection procedures based on a set of indicator variables for the expected 
performance and riskiness of entrepreneurs and their projects. Those failing to score 
sufficiently high on the criteria used are denied credit for whatever interest rate they 
might be willing to pay. As a consequence, several indicators of entrepreneurship 
potential performance such as education and experience might moreover turn out to 
be indicators of access to capital (Bates, 1990; Scherr et al. 1993). This clarifies part 
of the discussion below as to whether human (sometimes also social) capital variables 
have been included into the empirical models. To discriminate between the full 
information and asymmetric information case, several categories of empirical research 
have been performed.
2 An overview is given in Table 1.  
 
Relationship between assets and performance  
Evans and Jovanovic (EJ, 1989) test the extent to which wealth constraints are 
binding for entrepreneurs in the US. They relate the size of family assets to earnings 
from the venture. They thereby test the implication emerging from their model that 
the correlation between entrepreneurial earnings and initial assets is positive since 
wealthier people will have started businesses with more efficient capital levels. 
Conditional on the values of some common human capital variables, their reduced 
form estimates indeed support a positive correlation between initial assets and 
earnings.  
Cooper et al. ((CGW)1994) find the same positive correlation between initial assets 
and performance (survival and growth) of new ventures in The US. Their result is 
                                                           
2 The same categorization might be applied to research into the relationship between the probability of 
becoming an entrepreneur and access to capital. At least all approaches discussed here have been 
  6obtained while controlling for a rich set of human capital variables. Van Praag (2002) 
also relates financial variables, i.e. assets and a dummy for home ownership 
(frequently used as collateral), to survival of young entrepreneurs in the United States. 
The effect of these variables on the hazard out of entrepreneurship is insignificant. 
Van Praag uses a rich dataset too. 
Cressy (1996) explicitly aims at testing the hypothesis that the positive relationship 
between assets and survival generally found is spurious as a result of the underlying 
effect of human capital on both asset accumulation and survival. His empirical result 
on a sample of British entrepreneurs supports this hypothesis. He attributes his 
(superior) result to the availability of a rich dataset. His dataset is, however, certainly 
not richer than is Coopers’ et al (1994). He concludes that provision of finance is 
demand driven. Entrepreneurs self-select for funds on the basis of their human capital: 
more talented entrepreneurs would demand more loans. This conclusion contradicts 
most other conclusions from this empirical approach. 
Taylor (1999) estimates the effect of a rich set of potential determinants of the 
hazard out of self-employment, also for a sample of British entrepreneurs. One of the 
variables included was a dummy indicating whether the respondent had received 
interest or dividend payments exceeding £100 in a year prior to the start. This variable 
is interpreted as an indicator of asset ownership. Its negative effect on the hazard 
indicates a positive effect on survival.  
Several general disadvantages are attached to this method. First of all, the 
possibility of obtaining external finance remains unconsidered: it is assumed that the 
“external route to obtain finance” is totally inaccessible. Secondly, a monotone 
relationship is assumed between assets and performance, while in reality it might well 
be the case that up to a certain point more access to capital might help in enhancing 
performance, but “enough is enough”. This possible discontinuity in the relationship 
is not taken into account in this approach. A third drawback of the method in general 
is that family assets might well be the result of the entrepreneur’s “earning power”: 
without binding capital constraints, a correlation could still exist between assets and 
performance because of the entrepreneur’s ability affecting both quantities. A fourth 
drawback, finally, is that assets in general are badly reported in individual survey 
research and therefore unreliable figures, plagued with measurement error.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
applied to the analysis of that research question. 
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Table 1  
Empirical evidence of conditional Corr(access to capital, firm performance)>0 
Lack of access to capital 
measure /Performance measure 
Assets Inheritance  Windfall 
gains 
Earnings  EJ: +  HJR: +   
Survival  CGW:+; T:+; vP:0; 
C:0 
HJR: +  LO: + 
Growth CGW:  +     
CGW: Coopers, Gimenogascon, and Woo (1994); C: Cressy (1996); EJ: Evans and Jovanovic (1989); 




Relationship between inheritance receipt and performance  
As was noted already, one of the major drawbacks of the approach of merely relating 
assets, as a measure of access to capital, to new venture performance is the possible 
endogeneity of this measure. An interesting alternative might be the receipt of an 
inheritance. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) noted the particular appeal of such a 
variable: “The receipt of an inheritance is about as close to a “natural experiment” as 
one is likely to get in this area, which reduces potential endogeneity problems.”
4 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (HJR, 1994a) were the first to estimate the relationship of this 
inheritance variable with firm performance instead of entry. They find a positive 
effect of receiving an inheritance on firm survival and earnings in the United States.  
This innovative approach however only solves the third of the four drawbacks 
attached to the first approach. One better than that, if not applied in an adequate 
fashion, an additional disadvantage is evoked by the inheritance approach. Dunn and 
Holtz-Eakin (2000) analyzing transitions into self-employment formulate their finding 
as: “We find that young men’s own financial assets exert a statistically significant but 
quantitatively modest effect on the transition to self-employment. In contrast, the 
capital of parents exerts a large influence. Parents’ strongest effect runs not through 




                                                           
3 Bates (1990) is excluded from the literature overview because he has unfortunately not been able to 
establish the conditional correlation of interest due to problems of multicollinearity. 
4 Blanchflower and Oswald introduced this approach in their 1990 NBER working paper version of 
their 1998 article. 
5 However, HJR seem to have dealt with this issue in a neat way: by controlling for (i) whether the 
inheritance donor is an entrepreneur too and (ii) a measure of firm performance prior to the receipt of 
the inheritance. 
  8Relationship between windfall gains and performance  
Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) estimate the effect of windfall gains on the probability of 
being self-employed on a sample of Swedish individuals. They thereby assess the 
effect of this unique variable on some hybrid combination of the transition into self-
employment and survival.
6 They consider windfall gains as a dummy variable 
indicating whether people have ever won in lotteries as well as personal and spousal 
inheritances. They find significant effects on self-employment of both inheritances 
and lottery prizes. However, upon inclusion of additional control variables (specific 
and general human capital) the significant effect of inheritance receipts vanishes 
whereas the effect of lottery prizes remains significant. This supports the finding by 
Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) about the intergenerational correlation of 
entrepreneurship. 
The windfall gains approach, as ingenious as it is, does not solve the majority of 
the drawbacks associated with the first approach, though it somehow solves the 
problem of endogeneity.
7 The contribution and drawback of our approach are set out 
in the sequel. 
  
3.   ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Theory 
Consider the entrepreneurial performance measure gross receipts, as in Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1994) and in line with Evans and Jovanovic (1989): 
(1) Pi = θi f(ki) ε 
where θi is individual i’s ability or business acumen as an entrepreneur, f(.) is a 
production function with one input, capital (ki), and ε is a random factor to the 
production process. Individuals know their ability, unlike the analyst or banker who 
observes an indicator function of ability,  i θ
~
 only. Ability varies across individuals. It 
is assumed that ε has mean 1 and finite variance and that f(0)>0: the firm can produce 
output even in the absence of any inputs, other than the entrepreneur’s individual 
business acumen. The professional services industry is an example in which this is 
conceivable.  
                                                           
6 See Van Praag 2002 for a formalization of the relationship between being, becoming and survival as 
an entrepreneur. 
  9Ai is defined as the value of the individual’s personal assets, hence Ai-ki is the sum 
of money on which the entrepreneur earns capital income at rate r. By definition, ki -
Ai is the amount of capital financed by borrowing. The (risk neutral) entrepreneur 
maximizes total income: 
 (2) yi = θi f(ki) ε + r(Ai-ki) 
The optimal investment level of capital into the production process of the 
entrepreneur’s venture is therefore defined by: 
(3)  θi f’(k
*
i) = r 




i: entrepreneurial ability and capital are 
complementary factors of production; more talented entrepreneurs run larger scale 
firms. We assume that Ai is a non-decreasing function of θi: entrepreneurial ability is 
an indicator for general “earning power” from which assets might have resulted. The 
relationship between entrepreneurial ability and the amount of money that one wants 
to borrow in the money market at rate r,  -  A
*
i k i, is therefore ambiguous. Access by 
individual entrepreneurs to the most desirable amount of external capital, 
at price r is constrained by the factor  0
* − = i i k l i β , where  1 0 ≤ ≤ i β . 1 = i β  
represents the fully constrained entrepreneur, unable to obtain a single additional euro 
of external capital. 0 = i β  represents the unconstrained. The amount of external 
capital obtained is ( ) ) 1 ( i i i i k l (A ) 1 i − ∗ − = ∗ − β β for all entrepreneurs. The value of 
i β depends on “borrowing power”, which is dependent in turn on collateral and  i θ
~
.  
The central question of our analysis is to what extent  i β creates performance 
losses, i.e. the effect of  i β on the expected (constrained) performance: 
(4)    )) )( 1 ( ( )) ( (
* * *
i i i i i i i i i i i A k A f A k k f P − − + = − − = β θ β θ
The formula shows that a higher value of  i β would create, if any, more (absolute) 
damage to a high ability entrepreneur than to a low ability entrepreneur. This effect 
should not be mixed up with the idea that  i β  itself will usually be higher for low 
ability entrepreneurs than for high ability entrepreneurs. In order to get rid of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Though both participation in a lottery and selection into entrepreneurship are significantly related to 
risk attitude and therefore to each other (See Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag, 2002) 
  10intruding effect of ability on the relationship between absolute performance and 
capital constraints, we consider relative performance in the sequel: 
(5)  log   )) ( ( log log
* *
i i i i i i A k k f P − − + = β θ
Equations 4 and 5 immediately show a drawback of all approaches as discussed in 
the previous section: Simply looking at how a change in Ai affects performance does 
not measure the effect of capital constraints on performance. This would only be true 
for the subset of entrepreneurs with insufficient opportunity to obtain capital.   
Figure 1 shows the complex theoretical interrelationships between entrepreneurial 
performance, human capital, assets, capital constraints, and investment.  
 
Figure 1 

















In the following we shall temporarily assume that the positive effects of qi on Ai and 
k*
i  just cancel out: Capital need (ki* - Ai ) is independent of qi and does not affect 
i β or P  
Measurement issues 
The centerpiece of our analysis is  i β . Our empirical equivalent is a dummy variable 
indicating whether an entrepreneur has experienced capital constraints subsequent to 
the start of her venture. It is formed by the answer to the following question: 
“Did you experience problems in obtaining sufficient (external) capital at the start of 
your venture?” 
  11Yes, and I didn’t solve the problem          7% 
Yes, but I solved the problem          17% 
N o           7 6 %  
We consider the 7% of entrepreneurs who experienced these problems but did not 
solve them as being capital constrained ( i β =1).
8 The other 93% is characterized by 
i β =0: they are in a position to operate their business at the optimal level,  . 
However, to find an as unbiased as possible estimate of the conditional effect of 
*
i k












 might seem too severe, i.e. be biased upwards, due to screening or 
redlining by external capital suppliers based on  i θ
~
. This  i θ
~
 has also direct (positive) 
impact on performance thereby generating this bias. We solve the upward bias 
resulting from issue A by means of three measures: 




, into the equation that are 
known to affect entrepreneurship performance
9.  




, into the equation that are 
known to affect entrepreneurship performance.
10.  
We include variables that we use as additional signals for entrepreneurial 
ability, i θ , based on the known result of credit scoring by external capital suppliers: 
we know whether banks, family/friends, and business partners have contributed to  . 
We consider the assignment of a loan by family/friends, and in particular by business 
partners as informative about unobserved heterogeneity.  
i k
                                                           
n
8 We considered the 7%+17% of the sample who answered yes as an alternative indicator of capital 
constraints. This weakened the result considerably. The same holds for the alternative specification 
where the first answer is translated into βi =1, the second into βi =0.5 and the third is equivalent to βi 
=0. This rendered much weaker results too. 
9 Empirical support can be found in for instance Bates, 1990; Bosma et al. 2002; Cooper et al., 1994; 
Cressy, 1996; De Wit and Van Winden, 1993; Le, 1999; Lindh and Ohlsson, 1996; Taylor, 1999; Van 
Praag and Cramer 2001; Van Praag, 2002; Pen ings et al 1998. 




is based can be found in Bosma et al., 2002; Brüderl 
and Preisendorfer, 1998 and Pennings et al., 1994. 





 might seem too weak, i.e. be biased downwards, due to 
Time hypothesis People who spend a considerable proportion of their time on other 
paid activities will probably show weaker performance and simultaneously face lower 
capital constraints. Without any additional corrective measures, this spurious effect 
would be included in an estimate of the coefficient for i β  leading to a downward bias.  
Motivation hypothesis Financial independence from the venture might be a cause 
for lower capital constraints and might simultaneously result in a weaker motivation. 
Without correction, this spurious effect would again be mistakenly included in an 
estimate of the coefficient for i β  and lead to a downward bias.   
A third hypothesis that would cause a downward bias of the estimated effect of  i β  
is the over-investment /overconfidence hypothesis. Overconfident entrepreneurs might 
aim at larger than efficient amounts of startup capital. When they cannot get access to 
the large amount they desire, they feel constrained and report so. Unfortunately, we 
are unable to test this hypothesis that would again lead to an underestimate of the 
effect of the capital constraint on performance:  the overconfident entrepreneur will 
perform better given a lower and thereby more optimal amount of capital.  
We try to correct the potential downward bias resulting from the first and second 
issue headed by B by means of the inclusion of additional variables: 
Time hypothesis: a dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur spends 
more than twenty hours per week on other paid activities. 
Motivation hypothesis: (1) A categorized variable “amount of other income 
available”, and (2) A dummy variable indicating whether the entrepreneur is 
financially dependent on the stream of income generated by her venture. 
We conclude this subsection by a comparison of the distinctive (potential) 
(dis)advantages of this approach to the problems and favorable features attached to 
the empirical approaches as described in the previous section. First and foremost, our 
estimate of β ’s coefficient show the effect on performance of being capital 
constrained for the group of entrepreneurs who are capital constrained. Other 
approaches generate an estimate of the effect of an increase in assets on performance 
for all entrepreneurs at the same time, whether they face capital constraints or not. 
  13Secondly, our estimate of β ’s coefficient embodies the effect of capital constraints 
that remain after the possibility of obtaining external finance has been explored. The 
other approaches assume that the “external route to obtain finance” is totally 
inaccessible.  
A third, though rather limited, relative advantage of the current approach is that we 
try to cope with the causality issue in a more elaborate way. We embody many 
controls, also for access to capital from lenders who presumably have more 
information about the type and intentions of the entrepreneur than we as researchers 
do. In this manner, we try to disentangle the real effect of insufficient capital from the 
spurious effect. We cannot conceive of a better way of doing this, since instrumental 
variable methods and other methods that cope in a more fashionable way with 
possible endogeneity of access to capital are all inappropriate in this case. Identifying 
variables or instruments are lacking by definition since access to capital is a function 
of ownership of capital and perceived business acumen. 
A potential drawback of our approach finally is that we rely on the self-reported 
subjective answers of individual entrepreneurs as to whether they started their venture 
with or without significant capital constraints. Over or underreporting of this variable 
would lead to biased results. 
 
Estimation models 
Let Πi be the profit (P1) for respondent i in 1997, and xij respondent i ‘s value of 
determinant j in 1994. We specify the logarithm of profit as the dependent variable 
rather than profit itself, so that changes in the determinants influence relative profit 
rather than absolute profit (in e.g. euros). The estimated model is the following:  
Π
=
Π Π + + = Π ∑ i ij
J
j
j i x ε β α
1
ln ,   where  .  ) , 0 ( ~
2
Π
Π σ ε N i
The model for employment is analogous to the model for profit. Let Li be the 
cumulated employment (in fte) generated by respondent i between 1994 and 1997, 









i x L ε β α + + = ∑
=1




i N σ ε
 
  14 Both the profit and the employment measures have zero as the lower bound. 
Negative profits are not observed, while negative employment is non-interpretable. 
Therefore, both equations are estimated using tobit regressions. For duration, we 
apply a log-logistic survival model. (See Lancaster, 1992, p. 44). 
 
4.   DATA 
Sample 
The panel results from annual questionnaires conducted on a sample taken from all 
newly registered firms in the first quarter of 1994 as reported in the database of the 
Dutch Chamber of Commerce. Firms were included in the sample upon meeting 
several conditions. They had to be founded in the first quarter of 1994. Firms 
reregistering due to a change in Chamber of Commerce district or some other change 
in location, activities or legal status were excluded. Firms that used to be part of a 
previously existing firm were also excluded. The agricultural and mining sectors 
remain unconsidered as well.  
The initial 10,627 firms were contacted by telephone. A total of 3,000 firm 
founders agreed to participate in the survey. 1,939 firm founders finally completed the 
1994 questionnaire. Our base sample however is somewhat smaller because we 
discarded entrepreneurs from this database for several reasons. 250 firm founders 
appeared to be hardly more than “hobbyists”: they had an additional simultaneous 
employment contract of more than forty hours per week. We furthermore discarded 
53 observations whose businesses appeared to have existed for less than 2 months in 
total. Twenty-eight observations were deleted because they didn’t complete the vital 
question concerning capital constraints. Of the remaining 1,608 firm founders, 1,323 
answered all subsequent annual questionnaires of 1995-1997. This implies an attrition 
rate of 18% (285 observations). The firm size and industry distributions of the 1994 
and 1997 respondents were comparable to those of the initial sample.  
The first questionnaire consisted of 90 questions divided in the categories general, 
firm, work experience, motives, founding situation, capital and investments, problems 
encountered, control and subcontracting, environment and market, sales and 
vulnerability, targets and strategy, performance and expectations as well as a rich set 
of background variables. The questionnaire in 1997 contained a total of 44 questions, 
in approximately the same categories. 
  15The information from the first questionnaire is used for the construction of 
potential determinants of performance, the independent variables in the analysis. 
Entrepreneurial performance itself is exclusively measured by means of variables 
constructed from the subsequent questionnaires. In this manner, we avoid problems of 
serially reversed causality.  
 
Measures of entrepreneurial performance 
We employ three performance measures: P1, P2 and P3. The first considers profit 
given survival and is equated to the profit level of 1997. The entrepreneur has then 
been active for three years. In particular, profit levels of the first two years might be 
somewhat misleading due to initial (sunk) investments that are written off at the 
expense of profit levels. For entrepreneurs that are known to have ended their 
businesses, the profit variable is equated to zero. The second measure used is the 
cumulative employment created in the period 1994-1997
11. We consider the 
employment created (in fulltime equivalents) by an entrepreneur as a measure of 
social performance in contrast to profit that can be seen as a measure of individual 
performance. The third performance measure is survival duration. Is the firm still in 
business in 1997? And if not, how many months has the entrepreneur survived?  
Table 2 shows descriptives of the performance measures and their 
intercorrelations. The table distinguishes entrepreneurs with and without capital 
constraint. 
The total sample size of 1,323 refers to the number of entrepreneurs for whom at 
least one of the dependent variables is available. The number of valid observations for 
analyses on P1, P2 and P3 are 1,168, 989, and 1,073 respectively. These samples 
include entrepreneurs who haven’t survived until 1997: their profit level is equated to 
zero, their cumulative employment has been cumulated up until their exit. 
The average entrepreneur earned an annual profit level of  € 20,200. Exclusively 
considering the group of entrepreneurs that has survived the first 42 months, the 
maximum possible within the panel, this number increases to € 28,000. To relate this 
to for instance the income of a Dutch wage earner, we mention that the (gross) 
                                                           
11 Other employment measures that have been investigated are employment growth and the 1997 
employment level. Both alternatives showed results that did not differ significantly from cumulated 
employment. 
  16average income in the same year amounted to € 22,000
12. There is a huge variance in 
this income, as is well known for entrepreneurial positions.  
 
Table 2  






constraint: β =1 
(Nc=93) 
Without capital 







Mean Std  Dev Mean 
  Std Dev  P1 P 2 P 3
P1: Profit (10 000 Dfl)  4.46 8.5  3.42  7.2  4.53  8.6  1     
P2: Cumulated 
employment (fte)  3. 56  15.9  2.25  5.7  3.64  16.3  0.41** 1   
P3: Survival (months)  36.78 11.2  34.15  13.9  36.98  10.9  0.26**  0.11** 1
**  Significant at 5 percent level. 
  
The average cumulated employment over the past three years is more than 3.5 
fulltime equivalents, with a large variance and a very skewed distribution. 
Considering the group of active entrepreneurs in 1997, the average cumulated 
employment amounts to even 4.8 fte. The median active entrepreneur has no 
employees (66% actually has no employees), whereas 72% of the sample has 
generated cumulative employment levels of less than 1 fulltime equivalent. Ten 
percent has more than 10 fte employees, five percent more than 20 fte. Considering 
the distributions and averages of annual employment levels over the years 1994-1997, 
we see the average increasing from 0.41 in 1994, to 0.57 in 1995, 0.74 in 1996 to 0.99 
in 1997. At the same time, the percentage of entrepreneurs without any personnel 
decreases from 86% in 1994 to 38% in 1997. This growth is different for capital 
constrained entrepreneurs: their average firm size increases from 0.22 in 1994 to 1.27 
in 1997, whereas 25% of this group of entrepreneurs has no personnel in 1997. 
The average (truncated) survival duration is slightly more than 3 years: most 
entrepreneurs (65%) have survived 42 months, the entire period from the start of the 
panel till the last interview in 1997. Six percent has not survived their first year, 
another 6% “died” within their second year, whereas 4% exited within their third 
year. The first year hazard rate out of entrepreneurship among capital constrained 
entrepreneurs is almost twice as high: 12% of these entrepreneurs do not survive their 
first year. 
                                                           
12 Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) Netherlands 
  17The average scores on the three performance measures are all lower for the group 
of capital constrained entrepreneurs than for their unconstrained counterparts: the 
differences however are all statistically insignificant. Table 2 finally shows that the 
three measures of performance used are (unsurprisingly) positively correlated with 
each other.  
 
Determinants of entrepreneurial performance  
Table 3  














      
CAPITAL  CONSTRAINT  0.07 0.26 1.00 0.00 
       
HUMAN  CAPITAL       
Experience  in  business  ownership  0.07 0.26 0.05 0.23 
Experience in activities relevant to business 
ownership  0.72 0.45 0.71 0.46 
Experience  in  industry  0.66 0.47 0.66 0.48 
Age  divided  by  10  4.18 0.92 4.05 0.86 
Age divided by 10, then squared  18.31  8.03  17.17  7.22 
High  education  0.29 0.45 0.19 0.40 
Experience  as  an  employee  0.93 0.25 0.91 0.28 
       
SOCIAL  CAPITAL       
Contact with entrepreneurs in networks  0.28  0.36  0.27  0.37 
Way of information gathering:       
- General channels  0.00  1.00  -0.15  0.96 
- Direct business relations  0.00  1.00  0.04  1.00 
- Commercial relations  0.00  1.00  -0.28  0.64 
-  Fellow  entrepreneurs  0.00 1.00 0.05 1.01 
Emotional support from spouse  0.73  0.44  0.68  0.47 
Presence  of  spouse  0.84 0.37 0.80 0.41 
FINANCIAL  SCREENING       
Share own capital in start capital  0.65  0.41  0.56  0.43 
Fin.  also  by  bank  0.34 0.47 0.31 0.47 
Fin. also by loan from family  0.17  0.38  0.29  0.46 
Fin. also by business partner(s)  0.10  0.30  0.06  0.25 
TIME CONSTRAINT      
Spent 20+ hours on other paid activities  0.21 0.40 0.19 0.40 
MOTIVATION       
Other income available (categories)  2.65  1.99  2.06  1.91 
Dependent on profits from business  0.26  0.44  0.33  0.47 
CONTROL  VARIABLES      
Gender  0.71 0.45 0.75 0.43 
No affiliations with other businesses  0.94 0.24 1.00 0.00 
Goal: employment growth  0.42 0.35 0.49 0.35 
Motive: higher income  0.40 0.39 0.41 0.38 
Hours worked at the start (categories)  3.17  0.95  3.31  0.88 
  18Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the potential (and hypothesized) determinants 
of entrepreneurship performance. In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect 
of capital constraints on performance, we distinguish the following categories of 
variables: human capital, social capital, financial screening, time constraint, and 
motivation variables. Descriptives of control variables have been included too. These 
categories are discussed presently. 
 
Human capital The vector of human capital variables that is included in the model 
has the following elements. Professional experience of the business founder is 
measured with respect to several dimensions: experience in business ownership itself, 
experiences associated with business ownership (e.g. experience in leadership) and 
experience in the sector in which the founded business is active. Only seven percent 
of the entrepreneurs have previous experience in entrepreneurship; more than seventy 
percent claims to have experience in “leadership” associated activities. Two third of 
the entrepreneurs have gathered experience in the industry of their business choice 
before starting up their businesses. More than 90% of the entrepreneurs has 
experience in wage employment. These figures are no different for the group of 
capital-constrained entrepreneurs exclusively. The average starting age is 42. The 
effect of age on performance will be analyzed by the inclusion of age and age squared 
into the regression equations. Education enters the analyses as a dummy variable, 
differentiating the high-educated business founders (academic/higher vocational 
formal education) from the less educated ones. There are obviously fewer higher 
educated entrepreneurs within the group of capital constrained entrepreneurs (19% 
versus 29%) than average. 





in the model. The vector consists of the following variables. A dummy variable 
measures whether the business owner had (planned) contacts with other entrepreneurs 
through an entrepreneurs’ network in the first year of operation. 28% of the 
entrepreneurs has such network contacts. This percentage is no different for capital 
constrained entrepreneurs.  
We also derived information on initial(ly planned) strategies used by business 
owners to keep up with (environmental) developments relevant for their businesses.  
Respondents rated the activity on ten possible actions. They indicated whether they 
  19frequently, sometimes or never used certain information gathering channels, of which 
some are closely related. Factor analysis revealed four major strategies of channel 
usage:  
•  Focus on the branch (main indicators: keep up with literature; attending 
congresses, courses and branch exchanges)  
•  Focus on direct business relations (main indicators: information from customers 
and information from suppliers)  
•  Focus on commercial relations (main indicators: information from banks; 
commercial cooperation; advise from experts) 
•  Focus on fellow entrepreneurs. 
Using information channels is closely related to social capital, though it is usually not 
considered as such. It reflects the strategy used to retrieve relevant information from 
relationships. Since the relationships themselves do not occur naturally and since the 
information retrieval within each relationship somehow indicates the intensity of the 
relationship, we label the resulting factors as elements of social capital. The factors 
resulting from factor analysis are standard normally distributed. 
Finally, a partner and especially an emotionally supportive partner are considered 
potentially valuable social capital. 84% of the entrepreneurs have spouses of whom 
73% is considered emotionally supportive.  
Descriptives for Financial screening variables, used as additional signals for 
entrepreneurial ability, i θ , are shown in Table 3. We consider whether banks, family 
and friends, and business partners have contributed to k . The assignment of a loan 
by family members and friends, and in particular by business partners is considered as 
informative about unobserved heterogeneity. The average percentage of own capital 
in the actual total amount of start capital is 66%, and (remarkably) slightly lower for 
capital constrained entrepreneurs (56%). However, since the distribution is quite 
skewed, Table 4 is informative: it shows that 47% of the total number of 
entrepreneurs starts while exclusively relying (willingly or not) on their own capital. 
This percentage is somewhat lower, 42%, for capital constrained entrepreneurs. 
i
Furthermore, one third of all capital constrained entrepreneurs gets loans from 
banks, thereby not diverging from the average. Capital constrained entrepreneurs 
  20however get financial means from friends and family almost twice as frequently. 
Trust (and capital) by business partners is obtained by 10% of all entrepreneurs, 
whereas capital constrained entrepreneurs obtain this kind of capital in 6% of the 
cases. 
Table 4 
Share of own capital in total amount of start capital 
Share All  observations  apital constrained entrepreneurs:β =1 
.00  10.4 17.4 
.05  6.5 10.5 
.15  4.8 7.0 
.25  5.4 4.7 
.35  3.9 3.5 
.45  3.6 4.7 
.55  3.6 1.2 
.65  1.6 4.7 
.75  1.7 2.3 
.85  1.1 0.0 
.95  1.4 2.3 
1.00  46.8 41.9 
 
Time constraint Entrepreneurs who spend more than twenty hours per week on 
other paid activities are considered as time constrained: they are hypothesized to have 
lower entrepreneurial performance. One fifth of the sample has time constraints. This 
share is not different among the capital constrained entrepreneurs. 
Motivation The extent to which the entrepreneur is motivated to perform well 
might be negatively affected by a lack of financial dependence on the receipts of the 
business: we therefore measure whether the entrepreneur is dependent on the profits 
from the business and whether other income is available. 28% of all entrepreneurs is 
totally dependent on the receipts from the business, whereas 37% of the capital 
constrained entrepreneurs has the same dependent position.  
Control variables The commonly used set of control variables, including 
industries, gender, and startup motivation, is finally added to the regressions 
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5.   ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Profits 
The first column of Table 5 shows the result from the Tobit estimation with (log) 
profit as the dependent variable and only the capital constraint and some control 
variables as the independent variables. The estimation result is consistent with binding 
capital constraints: entrepreneurs who suffer from a lack of capital for their initial 
business investments have 63% lower profits. However, as was expected, column II in 
Table 5 shows that the effect of capital constraints on profit diminishes to 59% when 
controlling for human capital effects, the capital constraint still being significant. 
Human capital, as was assumed, appears to simultaneously affect performance 
positively and the capital constraint itself negatively (making its effect less severe). 
The main determinants of performance within the category of human capital factors 
are various sorts of experience and education. The most valuable type of experience is 
within-industry experience: having worked (as an employee) in the industry to which 
the business belongs, increases profit, ceteris paribus by 70%. Experience in business 
ownership increases profits by 50%, whereas general work experience as an employee 
increases profit by 40%.
13 Higher educated entrepreneurs earn a 20% return to their 
education.
14  
Controlling for social capital factors (column III) has the same expected 
diminishing effect on the capital constraint as was the case for human capital: the 
coefficient further decreases from 59 to 52% and remains significant. The most 
important social capital factor for expected profits is a spouse’s emotional support. 
Other social capital factors of influence are the usage of certain information gathering 
channels. Having and exploiting commercial contacts and contacts with fellow 
entrepreneurs seem to pay off. 
Our third hypothesis, that the capital constraint diminishes when correcting for 
financial screening factors, is not validated in this exercise (column IV). The capital 
constraint decreases from 52 to 51% only, and remains significant. Moreover, 
financial screening factors have no additional significant effect on profits, suggesting 
                                                           
13 The latter effect of general work experience on profit does not confirm expectations based on 
previous empirical research (cf. Van Praag 2002) 
14 This is of course an overestimate of the unbiased effect of education on performance: a probably 
considerable selection bias has not been corrected for. 
  22that these factors do not reveal any unobserved heterogeneity in addition to human 
and social capital factors that are influential for profit potential. 
Table 5 
Estimation results: Capital Constraints and Profits (P1) 
PROFIT  I II  III IV V    VI   
CAPITAL  CONSTRAINT  -0.63 ** -0.59 ** -0.52 ** -0.51  ** -0.49 **  -0.51  ** 
Human capital               
Experience in business ownership    0.50  ** 0.50  ** 0.49  ** 0.54  **  0.54  ** 
Experience relevant to business ownership    0.12  0.12 0.12 0.13    0.12   
Experience  in  industry    0.71 ** 0.67 ** 0.67  ** 0.66 **  0.65  ** 
Age divided by 10    0.30  0.11  0.14  0.11    0.05   
Age divided by 10, then squared    -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01    0.00   
High  education    0.20 * 0.19 * 0.18  0.20 *  0.22  ** 
Experience as an employee    0.39  * 0.36  * 0.35  * 0.41  **  0.40  * 
Social capital               
Contact with entrepreneurs in networks      -0.08  -0.08  -0.10    -0.10   
Way of information gathering:                 
- General channels      0.04  0.04  0.04    0.04   
- Direct business relations      0.05  0.05  0.06    0.06   
- Commercial relations      0.10  ** 0.10  ** 0.10  **  0.09  * 
- Fellow entrepreneurs      0.11  ** 0.11  ** 0.11  **  0.10  ** 
Emotional support from spouse      0.51  ** 0.52  ** 0.49  **  0.49  ** 
Presence of spouse      -0.21  -0.21  -0.17    -0.11   
Financial  screening               
Share own capital in start capital        0.00  0.03    0.04   
Fin. also by loan from family        0.00  -0.02    -0.02   
Fin. also by bank        -0.01  0.00    -0.01   
Fin. also by business partner(s)        0.23  0.24    0.25   
Time  constraint               
Spent 20+ hours on other paid activities          -0.35  **  -0.30  ** 
Motivation               
Other income available              -0.01   
Dependent on profits from business              0.19   
Control  variables               
Gender  0.49 ** 0.38 ** 0.39 ** 0.39  ** 0.40 **  0.39  ** 
No affiliations with other businesses  0.58  ** 0.49  ** 0.58  ** 0.61  ** 0.62  **  0.61  ** 
Goal: employment growth  0.37  ** 0.34  ** 0.29  * 0.28  * 0.25    0.23   
Motive:  higher  income  0.40 ** 0.35 ** 0.33 ** 0.33  ** 0.35 **  0.34  ** 
Hours  worked  at  the  start  0.45 ** 0.37 ** 0.35 ** 0.34  ** 0.30 **  0.28  ** 
Constant  -2.06 ** -3.39 ** -3.07 ** -3.16  ** -2.97 **  -2.81  ** 
# obs.  1168  1168  1168 1168 1168    1168   
Log Likelihood  -1643.2 -1610.9 -1599.2 -1598.2 -1594.6   -1593.1   
*   sign. at 10% level  ; ** sign. at 5% level 
 
The addition of the next two blocks of variables (columns V and VI in Table 5) serves 
to correct for the potential downward bias in the estimate for the capital constraint due 
to time and motivational constraints (see section 2). It appears that the inclusion of 
indicators for time and motivational constraints into the regression equation does not, 
contrary to expectations, increase the absolute value of the coefficient pertaining to 
  23the capital constraint, although the time constraint has the expected negative effect on 
profit. The remaining as “unbiased” as possible effect of the capital constraint on 




Estimation results: Capital Constraints and Duration (P2) 
Duration  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
CAPITAL  CONSTRAINT  -0.63 ** -0.53 * -0.47 * -0.47 * -0.47 * -0.48 *
Human  capital              
Experience in business ownership    0.17  0.17  0.17    0.19    0.19 
Experience relevant to business ownership    0.38  ** 0.29  0.29    0.30    0.30 
Experience  in  industry    0.58 ** 0.53 ** 0.54 ** 0.53 ** 0.52 **
Age divided by 10    0.68  0.77  0.77    0.77    0.75 
Age divided by 10, then squared    -0.05  -0.07  -0.07    -0.07    -0.06 
High  education    -0.01  -0.08  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08 
Experience as an employee    0.51  * 0.43  0.44    0.45    0.45 
Social  capital              
Contact with entrepreneurs in networks      0.10  0.09    0.09    0.09 
Way of information gathering:                 
-  General  channels      0.29 ** 0.29 ** 0.29 ** 0.29 **
- Direct business relations      -0.08  -0.08    -0.08    -0.08 
- Commercial relations      0.09  0.09    0.09    0.09 
- Fellow entrepreneurs      0.07  0.07    0.07    0.07 
Emotional support from spouse      0.40  0.40    0.40    0.40 
Presence of spouse      -0.47  -0.47    -0.46    -0.43 
Financial  screening              
Share own capital in start capital        0.05    0.05    0.07 
Fin. also by loan from family        0.07    0.06    0.07 
Fin. also by bank        -0.01    -0.01    -0.02 
Fin. also by business partner(s)        0.01    0.01    0.02 
Time  constraint              
Spent 20+ hours on other paid activities         -0.07    -0.05 
Motivation              
Other income available                -0.01 
Dependent on profits from business                0.07 
Control  variables              
Gender  0.38 ** 0.27  0.37 ** 0.38 ** 0.38 ** 0.37 **
No  affiliations  with  other  businesses  0.77 ** 0.77 ** 0.92 ** 0.91 ** 0.91 ** 0.91 **
Goal: employment growth  -0.07  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05    -0.06    -0.06 
Motive: higher income  -0.18  -0.24  -0.17  -0.16    -0.16    -0.17 
Hours  worked  at  the  start  0.35 ** 0.27 ** 0.26 ** 0.26 ** 0.26 ** 0.25 **
Constant  3.29  ** 0.81  0.75  0.71  0.73  0.80 
# obs.  1073  1073  1073  1073  1073  1073 
Log Likelihood  -1303.3 -1285.1 -1275.0 -1274.9  -1274.8  -1274.7
*  sign. at 10% level ** sign. at 5% level 
 
Table 6 shows determinants of duration in business (P2). It shows numbers for the 
capital constraint in the same order of magnitude: ranging from 63% without 
  24correction for potential biases (first column) to 48% including these corrections (sixth 
column).  
Column II shows that the inclusion of human capital factors diminishes the effect 
by 10 percent points, whereas column III shows that social capital factors account for 
a decrease of another six percent points. The other corrections have no effect. The 
effect on performance of human capital is almost invariant to the performance 
measure used: the same indicators of labor market experience affect duration and 
profit. Duration is affected by within-industry experience, by experience in business 
ownership as well as by experience as an employee. Education, however, plays no 
role as a determinant of survival. Moreover, it should be noted that the significance of 
the effects established partly vanishes upon inclusion of additional regressors into the 
equation (column III and further). 
Hardly any other factors affect entrepreneurial performance according to the 
current definition: the only remaining determinant of duration is the social capital 
variable indicating to what extent entrepreneurs have available and utilize general 
channels of information. The remaining as “unbiased” as possible effect of the capital 
constraint on duration is a disadvantageous 48%.   
 
Employment 
Table 7 shows that the third performance measure is not at all affected by capital 
constraints: the first column shows an unconditional negative but insignificant effect 
of 30%, whereas the sixth column shows an insignificant effect of zero.  
Though these effects are insignificant, to our surprise, they develop according to 
expectations: the absolute value decreases from column I to V and increases 
afterwards.  
The effect of human capital on employment or labor demand is comparable to the 
effect of this type of capital on the other performance measures, profit and duration. 
Previous experience in business ownership, within-industry experience and 
experience as an employee all affect labor demand in a positive manner. Education 
and other human capital factors do not play a significant role for the determination of 
employment levels.  
The accumulation of social capital is also informative of performance prospects in 
terms of employment. Being a member of a formal network through which one is in 
touch with fellow entrepreneurs is helpful. Having and utilizing (commercial) 
  25contacts for information gathering also has a positive association with employment 
potential. 
Table 7 
Estimation results: Capital Constraints and Employment (P3) 
Employment  I  II  III  IV    V    VI 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINT  -0.30   -0.28   -0.07   0.03    0.05    0.00  
Human  capital                   
Experience in business ownership        1.07**  0.91** 0.82 **  0.86 **  0.86**
Experience relevant to business ownership        0.08   -0.04   -0.05    -0.06    -0.10  
Experience in industry        0.69**  0.61** 0.63 **  0.63 **  0.58**
Age divided by 10        0.49   0.26   0.62    0.60    0.32  
Age divided by 10, then squared        -0.07   -0.05   -0.08    -0.08    -0.05  
High education        -0.20   -0.30   -0.25    -0.24    -0.19  
Experience as an employee        1.12**  0.86* 0.82 *  0.84 *  0.79*
Social  capital                   
Contact with entrepreneurs in networks              0.74** 0.72 **  0.71 **  0.67**
Way  of  information  gathering:                   
- General channels              0.28** 0.24 **  0.25 **  0.26**
- Direct business relations              0.05   0.05    0.05    0.06  
- Commercial relations              0.28** 0.24 **  0.24 **  0.22**
- Fellow entrepreneurs              -0.01   0.01    0.01    0.01  
Emotional support from spouse              -0.07   -0.09    -0.11    -0.14  
Presence of spouse              0.41   0.36    0.39    0.61  
Financial  screening                   
Share own capital in start capital                    0.03    0.05    0.10  
Fin. also by loan from family                    0.18    0.16    0.19  
Fin. also by bank                    0.65 **  0.65 **  0.63**
Fin. also by business partner(s)                    0.83 **  0.83 **  0.90**
Time  constraint                   
Spent 20+ hours on other paid activities                          -0.25    -0.07  
Motivation                   
Other income available                                -0.05  
Dependent on profits from business                                0.54**
Control  variables                   
Gender 0.70**  0.68**  0.65** 0.60  **  0.61  **  0.54**
No affiliations with other businesses  -0.54   -0.56   -0.38   -0.21    -0.20    -0.23  
Goal: employment growth  2.95**  2.86**  2.66** 2.50 **  2.48 **  2.43**
Motive: higher income  0.01   -0.11   -0.05   -0.06    -0.05    -0.11  
Hours worked at the start  1.07**  0.93**  0.86** 0.73 **  0.70 **  0.62**
Constant -6.20**  -8.04**  -7.32** -8.09  **  -7.94  **  -7.12**
# obs.  989 989 989  989   989    989 
Log Likelihood  -870.09   -856.78   -837.92   -827.39    -826.94    -821.69  
*   sign. at 10% level  ** sign. at 5% level 
 
The set of financial screening variables finally turns out to show the expected 
effects: although the financial screening by a family member does not seem to 
discriminate between groups with more and less favorable otherwise unobserved 
characteristics. However, banks and especially business partners seem to be selective 
  26in an effective way: they select entrepreneurs with more than average growth potential 
of human resources. Some final comments with respect to Table 7 (columns V and 
VI) are that time constraints remain insignificant whereas motivational constraints 
have the expected negative effect. 
 
Discussion 
Table 8 shows an overview of the estimation results. Several patterns pop up, together 
with some irregularities. Entrepreneurs who acknowledge unsolvable initial capital 
constraints experience lower profits, conditional upon survival, whereas their survival 
rate compares unfavorably to those who are not capital constrained. Capital 
constraints apparently generate imperfectness of investment opportunities in terms of 
size and/or timing.  
Table 8 
Overview of estimation results 
  Profits Survival  time  Employment 
      
CAPITAL CONSTRAINT  -0.51**  -0.48*  0.00 
Human  capital     
Experience in business ownership  0.54**  0.19  0.86** 
Experience relevant to business ownership  0.12  0.30  -0.10 
Experience in industry  0.65**  0.52**  0.58** 
Age divided by 10  0.05  0.75  0.32 
Age divided by 10, then squared  0.00  -0.06  -0.05 
High education  0.22**  -0.08  -0.19 
Experience as an employee  0.40*  0.45  0.79* 
Social  capital     
Contact with entrepreneurs in networks  -0.10  0.09  0.67** 
Way of information gathering:       
- General channels  0.04  0.29**  0.26** 
- Direct business relations  0.06  -0.08  0.06 
- Commercial relations  0.09*  0.09  0.22** 
- Fellow entrepreneurs  0.10**  0.07  0.01 
Emotional support from spouse  0.49**  0.40  -0.14 
Presence of spouse  -0.11  -0.43  0.61 
Financial  screening     
Share own capital in start capital  0.04  0.07  0.10 
Fin. also by loan from family  -0.02  0.07  0.19 
Fin. also by bank  -0.01  -0.02  0.63** 
Fin. also by business partner(s)  0.25  0.02  0.90** 
Time  constraint     
Spent 20+ hours on other paid activities  -0.30**  -0.05  -0.07 
Motivation     
Other income available  -0.01  -0.01  -0.05 
Dependent on profits from business  0.19  0.07  0.54** 
# obs.  1168 1073  989 
Log Likelihood  -1593.1 -1274.7 -821.69 
*   sign. at 10% level  ** sign. at 5% level 
 
Employment is not affected by this imperfectness of investment opportunities. The 
size of the effect of capital constraints decreases when correcting for human and 
  27social capital factors, but it remains significant and relatively large as compared to 
other factors of influence. Financial screening, time and motivational constraints do 
not consistently show the expected effects, neither directly on performance, nor 
indirectly by changing the coefficient of the capital constraint. However, the direction 
of both the indirect and direct effects is as expected in all cases, and significant in the 
case of at least one of the performance measure equations. Apparently, human and 
social capital factors generate and explain most of the relevant heterogeneity in the 
sample. 
It could be concluded from theory that, in the case that specific production 
functions would apply, a complementarity between human/social and financial capital 
might show up. We shall therefore now relax the assumption that the positive effects 
of qi on Ai and k*
i  just cancel out, i.e. that the need for capital (ki* - Ai ) depends on 
ability and thereby affects i β .  
In that case, capital or wealth constraints might generate more damage, the more 
human capital the entrepreneurs has. In order to discriminate between the effect of 
capital constraints on performance for higher and lower human capital levels, we 
stratified the sample into two subsamples according to education and experience in 
the industry (two relevant human capital variables). We re-estimated the equations as 
shown in Tables 5 to 7 on the subsample of entrepreneurs with more than average 
human capital (with experience and or higher education) and with less than average 
human capital (without experience and without higher education) separately. It turned 
out that the effects of capital constraints are indeed much larger for entrepreneurs with 
higher levels of human capital.  
Table 9 
The effect of capital constraints for lower and higher human capital levels 
  I II  III IV V VI 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINT ALL             
Profits  -0.63**  -0.59**  -0.52** -0.51** -0.49** -0.51** 
Survival time  -0.63**  -0.53*  -0.47* -0.47* -0.47* -0.48*   
Employment  -0.30  -0.28  -0.07  0.03 0.05 0.00 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINT: HC+             
Profits  -1.12**  -1.09**  -1.03** -0.99** -0.99** -1.03** 
Survival time  -1.05**  -0.95   –0.85  -0.83  -0.82   –0.79 
Employment  1.15  1.14  0.69 0.75 0.75 0.96 
CAPITAL CONSTRAINT: HC-          
Profits  -0.44* -0.42* -0.44*  -0.46*  -0.40  -0.41 
Survival time  -0.47 -0.43 -0.40  -0.40 -0.39 -0.40 
Employment  -0.05 -0.03 0.19    0.30  0.35 0.37 
*   sign. at 10% level , ** sign. at 5% level 
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lower number of remaining observations. Table 9 shows an overview of the effect of 
capital constraints on the three performance measures for the two strata in the sample. 
 
6.   CONCLUSION 
 
We have applied a novel method to evaluate the effect of (perceivably) experiencing 
capital constraints on entrepreneurial performance. The performance measures used 
are profit, duration in business and employment generated. We evaluate the effect of 
capital constraints for 1,000 valid observations from a panel of Dutch entrepreneurs 
who started their business in 1994. We control for human capital factors, social 
capital, and indicators of financial screening, time and motivational constraints. We 
quantify to what extent these controls affect the effect of capital constraints as well as 
to what extent they affect performance directly. We find that initial capital constraints 
and the implied suboptimal investment possibilities significantly hinder entrepreneurs 
in their performance as measured by profits (1997) and survival duration. 
The novelty, if any, lies in the fact that we use a dummy indicator for whether 
people have experienced initial capital constraints without finding a solution for their 
financial problems. Previous research with the same objective always made use of 
variables indicative of wealth, inheritances or windfall gains. The major drawback of 
these alternative approaches is that it is unknown whether the entrepreneurs who for 
instance obtain an inheritance indeed suffered from capital constraints and/or whether 
they could also obtain external capital. This drawback is not attached to the current 
approach. 
A couple of issues, however, remain to be solved. Our results are indicative of the 
effect on performance of whether an entrepreneur has experienced capital constraints. 
Future research based on a survey that quantifies the extent to which someone is 
capital constrained, i.e. β could be anything in between zero and one, might give 
further insight in the effects on performance of capital constraints. Data on the 
individual demand and supply of external capital might be informative to this end. 
Further research might moreover give additional insight in the effect of capital 
constraints on performance per human capital stratum; our results indicate that 
physical capital needs have a positive association with human capital, ceteris paribus.  
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